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Few arguments echo as strongly throughout United States 
constitutional history as those related to the role of the states in the 
federal union. Although scholars debate the extent to which federal 
and state powers were ever strictly separated, the states and the 
federal government today occupy overlapping spheres. In the modern 
context of overlapping powers, the preemption doctrine manages the 
intricate areas of overlap, with topics ranging from banking, to food 
and drug laws, to immigration. As a general matter, overlapping and 
concurrent powers are the norm, even when the federal government 
has staked out considerable territory. 
In one critical modern arena, however, the role of the states has 
been relegated to little more than the curtailment of active fraud. It is 
an insidious notion, rooted in a mistaken twist of precedent that then 
winds its way through various doctrines, increasingly circumscribing 
the ability of the states to act. Patent law is this arena, and here, the 
various threads come together resulting in a positive chokehold on 
any state activity. 
Paralysis for the states is occurring at a particularly important 
time in the history of patent law. Government actors at many levels 
are grappling with the emergence of a new business model in patents. 
It is popularly called patent trolling or, more tamely, non-practicing 
entity (NPE) activity or patent assertion entity (PAE) activity. In this 
model, the core business involves licensing and litigating stripped 
patent rights, as opposed to making products with those patents. The 
rapid expansion of this business model over the last decade has left 
courts and legislators grappling with its legal implications. 
The misinterpretation of precedent begins with what is known as 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. This set of Supreme Court cases from 
the 1960s regarding a citizen’s First Amendment right to petition 
government without fear of antitrust liability holds that no antitrust 
liability can attach when one petitions the government, even if that 
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petition would harm one’s competitors. The Noerr/Pennington cases 
embody the notion that antitrust law cannot be allowed to chill the 
exercise of one’s right to speak to the government. 
The Federal Circuit has extended Noerr’s rule regarding the 
limitations of federal antitrust law to limit state laws that might affect 
patents. This is a particularly odd theoretical leap. Noerr can be 
understood as celebrating states’ rights, in essence finding that 
citizens should be able to tell their state legislatures how they want to 
be governed and that federal law should stay out of the way. Thus, it 
is ironic that the Federal Circuit dispatches Noerr to serve the 
opposite master—that is, preventing states from responding to their 
citizens’ concerns. Most importantly, missing from the Federal 
Circuit’s logic is the Supreme Court’s focus on the chilling effect 
that antitrust’s treble damages might have on one’s ardor for 
speaking to the sovereign. Such treble damages concerns do not 
apply in the patent realm. 
In addition to stretching the Noerr line of cases, the Federal 
Circuit supports its preemption decisions with a series of thin and 
shaky patent cases. The series begins with a breathtakingly short 
decision from the early years of the Federal Circuit’s existence—a 
ruling noting simply that a patent holder has the right to threaten 
infringers with a lawsuit. While the statement is undoubtedly true, it 
does not answer the question of the limits to which a patent holder 
may go in enforcing those rights, not to mention whether a state can 
regulate such actions. With only slightly more analysis and support, 
the Federal Circuit later declared that patent holder demands cannot 
be challenged unless those demands are in bad faith—defined as 
whether the speaker believes in the truth of the statement. From these 
shaky foundations, the Federal Circuit has constructed a rule that 
states are preempted from regulating any patent demand behavior 
unless that behavior is both objectively and subjectively baseless. 
If the Federal Circuit’s logic is weak and without basis, however, 
how should patent preemption apply in these circumstances? After 
all, patent law is a federal scheme, and it cannot be true that states are 
free to rummage around in everything related to patents. The answer 
lies in Supreme Court preemption doctrine, both as the doctrine 
applies to intellectual property and to other areas of law. These cases 
demonstrate that state law cannot be entirely displaced simply 
because a particular commercial behavior relates to patents. Rather, 
states must have some space in which they can express local 
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preferences in relation to the business of patent demands. The 
Federal Circuit has ignored this aspect of Supreme Court precedent, 
leading to an improper limitation of the power of the states. 
Another additional key theme bubbles up through a number of 
modern Supreme Court preemption decisions. One can call this 
concept “heart and periphery.” Specifically, a state law that goes to 
the heart of federal legislation is more likely to be problematic; a 
state law that affects the periphery is more likely to be accepted. The 
heart/periphery concept differs from the familiar “congressional 
purpose” test in preemption analysis, which has become a wide-
ranging and open-ended inquiry in which courts have reached well 
beyond what Congress articulated. 
Applying this analysis to the Patent Act, issues such as validity, 
infringement, and procedures for challenging a patent lie at the heart 
of the federal scheme. Thus, a state’s ability to establish its own rules 
related to these areas is more likely to be preempted. In contrast, 
issues such as notice requirements, transparency, protection against 
pressure sales tactics, basic contract principles, and others stand at 
the periphery, and states should have breathing space to establish 
their own dictates. 
Importantly, in moving through preemption analysis, none of the 
possible approaches for analyzing a state’s proper role would suggest 
that a state should be limited to policing fraud and bad faith. That 
notion should be abandoned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
